The proposed eavesdropping scheme reveals that the quantum communication protocol recently presented by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 187902 (2002)] is not secure as far as quantum channel losses are taken into account. Alice and Bob to bound the amount of mutual information between them and a potential eavesdropper (Eve). If this amount of information is too high, the key has to be thrown away.
with the use of public channel) leads to the final key on which Eve's information is negligible.
Let us emphasize here two properties of the above presented general scheme. First, both the verification string and the key are generated by essentially the same procedure. Secondly, this scheme ensures generation of a random key only.
Recently, however, quite a different quantum cryptographic protocol has been proposed by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [3] . Their the so-called "ping-pong" protocol allows generation of a deterministic key or even direct secret communication. This improvement is obtained via random switching between two distinct communication modes -message mode and control mode. The key is generated in the message mode, while the eavesdropping is detected in the control mode. The only parameter which has to be analyzed in order to detect the eavesdropper is the correlation of bits generated in the control mode. The established key is believed to be insecure if and only if the results of measurements performed in the control mode coincide. The protocol have been claimed to be secure and experimentally feasible.
The security of the "ping-pong" protocol can be, however, impaired as far as the realistic, not-negligible-distance implementations of this protocol are considered. Which protocol can be considered as practical and secure was specified by Brassard, Lýtkenhaus, Mor and Sanders : "In order to be practical and secure, a quantum key distribution scheme must be based on existing -or nearly existing -technology, but its security must be guaranteed against an eavesdropper with unlimited computing power whose technology is limited only by the laws of quantum mechanics" [4] . The aim of our paper is to present an eavesdropping scheme which allows Eve to obtain some information about the key without any chance of being detected by a procedure proposed by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [3] . The scheme works provided that quantum channel losses are not too low, even if perfect photon sources and perfect detectors are used by Alice and Bob. The superiority of Eve over current technology is restricted to the possibility of near lossless photon transmission and performance of two-photon CNOT gate on polarization qubits. Our scheme considers the opportunity of eavesdropping arising due to a separation of two procedures, namely the verification procedure and the key generation. Note that in the "ping-pong" protocol Eve knows which mode (control or message) was chosen by Alice at the time when she could still manipulate the travel photon. On the other hand, we have to confess that an attack can be easily detected if the traditional form of verification involving some subset of the key (e.g. QBER estimation) is performed.
Let us start with the brief description of the "ping-pong" protocol of Bostr÷m and . Note that such a restricted Bell measurement can be easily performed [5] . The above result allows Bob to decode the information send to him by Alice.
Eve, of course, has no access to the home photon but can manipulate the travel photon while it goes from Bob to Alice and back from Alice to Bob. It was proved by Bostr÷m and Felbinger [3] that the eavesdropping strategy which has zero probability of being detected, does not provide any information about the key to Eve. The proof, however, does not take into account the possible transmission losses. We will now present the effective eavesdropping strategy which never produces the identical results of the measurements performed by Bob and Alice in the control mode. The price which has to be paid by Eve is the creation of additional losses in the transmission from Bob to Alice. These losses can be used to detect eavesdropping in the case of ideal channel. On the other hand, in the realistic case of lossy channel, Eve can replace the original channel by a better one and hide the eavesdropping losses in the channel losses.
The lossy quantum channel is described by a single-photon transmission efficiency η. 
Assuming that Alice sends both values of j with the same probability the mutual information between any two parties can be calculated. Let us now consider how to improve of the "ping-pong" protocol to make it secure.
This can be done, e.g., in a traditional way by sacrificing some part of the key in order to estimate QBER. Our scheme produces QBER equal to % 25 which should be easily detected as the QBER measured in the long-distance quantum key distribution experiments [6] [7] [8] does not exceeds a level of a few percents. There is, however, another way to protect the "ping- In conclusion we have presented undetectable eavesdropping scheme working on the realistic implementation of the "ping-pong" quantum communication protocol. The eavesdropping scheme works if the quantum channel losses cannot be ignored. It exploits the fact that the "ping-pong" protocol is performed with the use of two distinct modes (control and message mode), and moreover, that the information about which one of them is actually used is revealed too soon, i.e. in the time when Eve still has access to the travel photon. We Alice AB I as a function of quantum channel transmission efficiency η.
